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and Student Achievement in Kansas Public Schools 
Florence Neymotin*
abstr act
Recent changes in public school educational "nance in the state of Kansas are 
shown to have had little positive e#ect on student educational achievement. A 
di#erences structure is used to determine the e#ect of changes in revenue per 
student at the district level on changes in measures of student achievement. 
Measures of achievement employed in the analysis are student test scores in math 
and reading, as well as various measures of student persistence in schooling. 
introduction
During the time period of 1997–2006, the state of Kansas witnessed drastic 
changes in its "nancial approach to educational reform, as documented in the 
School District Finance and Quality Performance Act.1 !ese changes a#ected 
how the state distributes per student "nancial support to school districts in 
Kansas. In particular, the state of Kansas has progressively moved towards a 
redistributive system of "nancing education at the school district level. One 
example of this sort of change is increasing school funding based on the number 
of at-risk youth. 
1. Kansas Legislative Research Department, 2006. Amendments to the 1992 School District Finance 
and Quality Performance Act and the 1992 School District Capital Improvements State Aid Law 
(Finance Formula Components).
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!e current analysis of the amended Act "nds di#erent conclusions from 
those in an earlier study, which analyzed the Act before its recent amendments. 
John Deke examined the e#ect of the School District Finance and Quality 
Performance Act from the 1989 to the 1995 school years on the student dropout 
rate.2 Deke’s 2003 study focused on the immediate impact of the Act and found 
that, during the early 1990s in Kansas, a 20% increase in spending had the e#ect 
of increasing a student’s probability of going on to college by 5%. !e present 
analysis uses more current data than Deke’s study and is, therefore, unique in 
its ability to analyze the e#ects of the most recent amendments to the School 
District Finance and Quality Performance Act on student outcomes. 
In contrast to Deke’s results, the current analysis "nds only weak evidence 
that recent changes to school funding in Kansas had any role in increasing 
graduations rates. !ere is also little evidence of the e#ect of changes in school 
funding on improving student test scores. 
!e current analysis employs a di#erencing approach using district-level data 
for the years before and a$er 2005. A di#erencing approach for this particular 
time period is justi"ed due to the large number of amendments to the School 
District Finance and Quality Performance Act which occurred in the year 2005.
backgrou nd and motivational elements
!e history of education in the U.S. is one with varied systems of "nance and 
educational goals of both the educators and the governing legislative bodies.3 
Until recently, education in urban schools was primarily seen as achieving the 
goal of assimilation and indoctrination of immigrants and other non-traditional 
groups—such as American Indians—with the values of “Americans.”4 Education 
today, however, is recognized as a force that can yield many other bene"ts to 
the individuals accruing the education, their peers, and to the society they live 
in as a whole. In addition to increasing an individual’s earnings and longevity, 
increased education is also found to foster increases in civic participation, 
decreases in criminal activity, and a general heightening of the productive 
capacities of society.5 
2. J. Deke. 2003. A study of the impact of public school spending on postsecondary educational 
attainment using statewide school district re"nancing in Kansas. Economics of Education Review. 22: 
275-284. 
3. C. Goldin. 1999. A Brief History of Education in the United States. NBER Working Paper Historical 
Paper 119. 1-76. 
4. R.J. Murname. 2008. Educating Urban Children. NBER Working Paper no. 13791. 1-45.
5. D. Card and A. Krueger. 1996. Labor Market E#ects of School Quality: !eory and Evidence. In 
W. Burtless (Ed.), Does money matter? !e e"ect of school resources on student achievement and adult 
success. 97-140. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute Press. See: Jamison, E.A. et al. 2007. !e E#ects 
of Education Quality on Income Growth and Mortality Decline. Economics of Education Review, 26(6): 
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!ere is now, and has been for some years, debate regarding the appropriate 
measure of educational attainment.6 Two routes have generally been taken in 
the economics literature in answering this question. !e "rst route measures 
educational attainment with years of completed schooling, and the second 
route measures educational attainment in a broader sense via the test scores of 
students.7
!ere are bene"ts and drawbacks to both of these methods of measuring 
educational achievement. One of the clear bene"ts of using years of schooling 
as an outcome measure is that it is more intuitive, easily de"ned, and the input 
is clear—time in school. However, years of schooling as an outcome may not 
actually be capturing what it should. It is not clear that actual physical presence 
in a classroom is equivalent to “learning” and similarly it is unclear whether 
students whose test scores are higher needed to physically be present in school 
to achieve success. 
A student’s test scores, on the other hand, by measuring not just his or her 
physical presence in a classroom but also what has been absorbed, are a more 
precise measure of what the student is actually learning. However, test scores 
must take factors of the educational process into account which are not solely 
school-based inputs. Test scores may re%ect inherent abilities of the child, the 
time the child puts into studying at home, or parental inputs into education 
accrued in the home. For this reason, test scores may be a better measure of 
achievement, but for these same reasons will be more di&cult to manipulate.8 
!e current analysis takes the following approach: Test scores are used in 
addition to measures of years of schooling “attained”—alternately termed 
“persistence” in this article—as the outcomes of interest. In this way, it is possible 
to determine how both of the classical measures of educational achievement are 
771-788. See: H.M. Levin et. al. 2007. !e Public Returns to Public Educational Investments in African-
American Males. Economics of Education Review. 26(6): 699-708; L. Lochner, L. and E. Moretti. 2004. !e 
E#ect of Education on Crime: Evidence from Prison Inmates, Arrests, and Self-Reports. !e American 
Economic Review. 94(1): 155-189; K. Milligan et. al. 2004. Does education improve citizenship? Evidence 
from the United States and the United Kingdom. Journal of Public Economics. 88: 1667-1695.
6. E.A. Hanushek. 1986. !e Economics of Schooling: Production and E&ciency in Public Schools. 
Journal of Economic Literature. 24(3): 1141-1177.
7. D. Card and A. Krueger, 1996, op. cit. 2002. School Finance Reform, the Distribution of School 
Spending, and the Distribution of Student Test Scores. Journal of Public Economics. 83(1): 49-82. Card and 
Payne note that several appropriate measures of educational achievement to use are student test scores and 
measures of persistence such as the graduation rate or post-secondary attendance or college graduation 
rates. !is article is also particularly appropriate to the current analysis as it looks at changes in district 
"nances and how they a#ect student outcome measures. !ere are various papers using test scores as 
the relevant outcome measure in the literature dealing with the e#ects of school "nances on educational 
achievement. For one example see: J. Guryan. 2001. Does Money Matter? Regression-Discontinuity 
Estimates from Education Finance Reform in Massachusetts. NBER Working Paper 8269. 1-54.
8. Test scores have two additional bene"ts. !ey are a factor that is more variable in what employers 
see, i.e. there are many individuals with the same level of schooling but di#erent test scores. Test scores 
are also considered more integral to increasing levels of societal production. 
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a#ected by changes in per pupil revenues. 
Just as there are two avenues to measuring educational achievement in 
schooling, there have been two prominent avenues for determining how 
educational outcomes can be manipulated, which are through (1) changes in 
total revenues per student and (2) changes in class size. !e current analysis 
focuses on the "rst avenue—namely it determines the e#ect of per pupil revenues 
on measures of student achievement.9 Part of the reason for the popularity of 
this method is because of data availability on revenues per student through state 
departments of education and the department of the census. 
!e second possible way to measure school resources is through measuring 
class size. !is approach has encountered some obstacles in the literature due to 
inadequate methods for ensuring that there is exogenous variation in class size.10 
!e main result in these studies has shown that class size is indeed an e#ective 
method for increasing student educational achievement.11 Reduced class size is 
particularly e#ective at helping students who are either “at risk”—experiencing 
some type of behavioral problems—or in younger grades and hence, easier to 
in%uence. Although this article does not employ class size data in the analysis, 
this is a possible avenue for additional or future research. 
In terms of policy, the "rst step to determining whether total revenues per 
student a#ect student achievement is to document a relationship between 
policy related to school funding and actual changes in the amount of funding 
schools receive.12 !is issue is complicated by the fact that individuals o$en 
sort themselves into neighborhoods as a result of changes in school funding 
and possibly either counteract or exacerbate the intended e#ects of changes in 
9. One might be tempted to use formula grants or a more speci"c breakdown of student funding in 
schooling when looking at the e#ect of "nances on achievement. !ere are several problems with using 
this approach. !e "rst problem is that there is o$en a complicated relationship between the various 
subtypes of funding. !e second related problem is that funding is o$en allocated based on formula 
grants and when the funding runs out, then the actual allocation may be somewhat haphazard. For this 
reason, using total revenues or expenditures per student does not get into the minutiae and so avoids 
these particular pitfalls. 
10. C. Hoxby. 2000. !e E#ects of Class Size on Student Achievement: New Evidence from Population 
Variation. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 115( 4): 1239-1285
11. E. Lazear. 2001. Educational Production. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 116(3): 777-803.
12. One of the earliest studies in this genre was an analysis of the e#ects of educational "nance reform 
in California on actual school "nances. !e major changes a#ecting California educational "nance at 
the time of the study were the advent of Proposition 113 and the Serrano ruling. R. Fernandez and R. 
Rogerson. 1999. Education Finance Reform and Investment in Human Capital: Lessons from California. 
Journal of Public Economics. 74(3): 327-350. See also: S.E. Murray et al. 1998. Education-Finance Reform 
and the Distribution of Education Resources. !e American Economic Review. 88(4): 789-812. It is 
also possible to answer a similar question using methods of calibration rather than employing actual 
documented policy changes. !e authors of the study who do this "nd that switching from a system 
of state "nance of education to one of purely local educational "nance would increase school district 
educational spending. R. Fernandez and R. Rogerson. 1998. Public Education and Income Distribution: 
A Dynamic Quantitative Evaluation of Education-Finance Reform. !e American Economic Review. 
88(4): 813-833.
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funding.13 A$er showing that there is an e#ect of policy on changes in revenues 
per student, some studies went further and looked at the e#ect of these funding 
changes on student outcomes—with the aforementioned methodology.14 In 
the case of Kansas, the time period of interest (1997–2006) did not witness the 
enactment of any new major legislation a#ecting its school funding practices. 
It did, however, witness a large number of amendments to its School District 
Finance and Quality Performance Act. !is is one of the major education acts 
in Kansas, whose goal is the redistribution of "nances to school districts to 
equalize educational resources.15 Of the many amendments that were enacted to 
the School District Finance and Quality Performance Act, those that went into 
e#ect targeting at risk students were perhaps the most important amendments 
for the purposes of the current study.16 
Deke’s 2003 study is the only one to analyze the e#ects of the School District 
Finance and Quality Performance Act. Deke's analysis (2003) focuses on the 
years from 1989–1995 and the initial impact of the act. !is does not account for 
the many amendments over the last 13 years. !e current analysis instead seeks 
to determine how recent changes in per pupil revenues have caused changes 
in measures of student achievement, that is, how recent changes in education 
"nance have a#ected the educational achievement of Kansans.17 !e data 
13. C. Hoxby. 2001. “All School Finance Equalizations Are Not Created Equal.” Quarterly Journal 
of Economics. 1189-1231. !e issue of student sorting by location is not directly considered; however, 
it should be noted that the period considered represents one where only amendments were made to 
the main legislation on school "nancing, but no new major legislation enacted. It is less likely that 
individuals will sort as a direct result of application of the amendment rather than application of a larger 
piece of legislation. In terms of the concern that individuals are sorting on school quality irrespective of 
knowing about the enactment of legislation, is not formally treated in the analysis, however an argument 
is made in footnote 28 that addresses potential biases which will result from the estimation. !e sign of 
the bias is discussed. It would represent an interesting extension of the current analysis to additionally 
include a methodology incorporating a sorting on school quality or an analysis speci"cally targeted 
to urban versus rural populations where the issues of sorting would vary—with the urban population 
being presumably more stable. 
14. See J. Guryan. 2001. Guryan exempli"es the logic of examining school "nance reform. In his 
work on Massachusetts schools, he "rst calculates the fraction of funding passed through to schools 
as a result of a particular Massachusetts policy change and then looks at the e#ect of this change in 
funding on student test scores. !e current analysis, because of the more gradual and cumulative nature 
of policy changes, is not the right venue to employ a technique of regression discontinuity design in 
which Guryan employs a simple pre-and post-reform structure to test for the e#ect of policy changes on 
changes in school funding. In the current analysis, there was an initial change in funding followed by 
several later changes and amendments to the funding structure. 
15. In September 2006, the Kansas Legislative Research Department published a document detailing in 
great speci"city the particular changes made to the School District Finance and Quality Performance Act. 
As can be seen from this document, and as noted later on in this article, the majority of signi"cant changes 
to the act were enacted for the 2005 school year. See: Kansas Legislative Research Department, 2006. 
16. In conversations with Kansas legislators, it became apparent that the most important and recent 
changes to this act were in targeting special education students and at-risk student populations. Because 
of the nature of the current analysis, targeting at-risk students will clearly a#ect empirical results. 
17. Notice that the e#ects of legislation on changes in per pupil revenues are not tested per se. Although 
trends in revenues per student (unadjusted for other factors in districts changing over time) can be seen, 
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employed in the current analysis comprise the longest time frame which can 
reasonably be used to capture the e#ects of the amendments to the act rather 
than the act itself.18 
data
Information on school district level measures of student achievement including 
test scores, graduation rates, and dropout rates come from the Kansas State 
Department Board of Education (KSDE).19 Subject test scores used are 
math, reading, science, and social studies. Speci"cally, the test scores provide 
information on the percentage pro"cient in each grade. Information on school 
district characteristics, revenues per student, as well as an alternative measure 
of student achievement—the diploma rate—come from the National Center 
for Education Statistics (NCES).20 Multiple measures of student persistence are 
employed in the analysis because these measures were compiled by di#erent 
agencies and will, therefore, serve as a robustness check in the analysis. !e 
population for the analysis includes all school districts in the state of Kansas.
!e general period covered in this analysis is the 1997–2006 time period. 
While data for student persistence—dropout rates, fraction receiving diplomas, 
and the graduation rate—are available for the full time period in question, data 
for reading and math test scores are only available for the years 2004–2006. 
Data for test scores in science and social science are available for the years 2003 
and 2005, and for 2005 respectively. !e reason for the piecemeal nature of the 
test-score data is that test scores were not uniformly administered each year, 
and only certain test scores were administered in each particular year for all 
school districts. It is also not possible to employ earlier test-score data due to 
a change in the nature of testing in Kansas and tests prior to 2004, which are 
this is not a formal element of the analysis. !e main purpose of discussing the nature of legislative 
processes over this time period is to motivate the empirical analysis of the e#ect of total revenues per 
student on student achievement, rather than constituting a separate part of the analysis interesting in its 
own right. In some sense, due to the gradual nature of the enactment of the amendments, it would be 
much more di&cult to determine the e#ect of amendments on actual changes in revenues per student. 
!is is in contrast to a more structural approach or a regression discontinuity approach as discussed in 
earlier papers. 
18. In order to not capture the e#ects of the act, but rather only the e#ect of its amendments, the data 
was chosen to begin with the year 1997. !e latest data currently available to allow for a consistent end 
date for all measures was the year 2006. For the test-score data, not all tests were given in each of the 
relevant years; however, the two main tests (reading and mathematics) were given in the years 2004, 
2005, and 2006 so the di#erencing portion of the analysis uses the 2004 and 2006 years for the analysis. 
19. To be precise, the fraction of students receiving diplomas is used as the outcome measure of 
persistence. !is measure is constructed for school district k in year l as: 
Fraction_Diplomask,l = # Diplomas_Awardedk,l
 Enrollment_Grade_12k,l
20. CPI estimates are used to correct total revenues per student for in%ation. !e year 1997 is 
arbitrarily chosen to have the basket price of 100. 
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not comparable in nature to tests in 2004 and a$erwards. For this reason, while 
the test score portion of the analysis provides an interesting counterpoint to the 
persistence rate analysis, it is the persistence rates that represent the longer time 
frame upon which to base results of the analysis and are, therefore, the more 
interesting portion of the analysis. 
methodology
Estimation begins with a cross-sectional Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
regression analysis of the e#ect of total revenues per student on measures of 
persistence a$er including school district characteristics as control variables. 
!e use of a regression analysis is employed because it allows for a determination 
of the independent e#ect of each of the right-hand side variables on the le$-
hand side variable. In this analysis, the le$-hand side, or the “outcome” variable 
in each of the various cross-sectional regressions is represented by the various 
di#erent measures of student achievement and persistence, while the right-hand 
side variables are total revenue per student and school-district characteristics. 
Speci"cally, the model employed is for school district k in year l:
Persistencek,l = #0 + #1TRSk,l + #2DistSchlsk,l + #3DistPopk + $k,l (1)
Where Persistence is either the dropout rate, the fraction receiving diplomas, 
or the graduation rate; TRS is total revenues per student; DistSchls are the 
variables describing the school district, i.e. the pupil teacher ratio, the fraction 
on free lunch, the number of full-time equivalent teachers, and total enrollment; 
DistPop are the variables describing the population in the school district, i.e. the 
fraction of 5–17 year olds under the poverty line, median family income, the 
fraction of males and of females in the labor force, and fraction of individuals 
with varying levels of education.21 
!e standard assumption used throughout the analysis is that a school 
district’s quality is proxied by its observable characteristics.22 Since student 
achievement is a#ected by school district quality, and the measure of total 
revenues per student will also be related to school district characteristics, leaving 
school district characteristics out of the regression will cause a biased measure 
of the relationship between persistence and total revenues per student. It is for 
this reason that characteristics of school districts are essential to include in the 
21. As seen in Table 2, the education variable is broken into the fraction of individuals who have (1) 
a college degree or higher, (2) associate degree, (3) high school diploma or GED, (4) between 9 and 12 
years schooling but no diploma, (5) between 1 and 8 years of schooling, (6) no schooling—the omitted 
category. 
22. !e chosen set of school district characteristics are standard in their use in the literature and 
should, in all likelihood, capture the major characteristics of school districts that are relevant for 
inclusion in the present analysis. 
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analysis to determine the independent e#ect of total revenues per student on 
student achievement, represented by #1 in the previous regression. In this and 
all later parts of the analysis heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are used.
When using school district test scores—percentage pro"cient in the grade—
as the outcome measure, the same previous general structure was employed. 
One change, however, is that regressions are run separately for each district k, 
year i, and grade g. Speci"cally, 
TestScorek,i,g = #0 + #1TRSk,i + #2DistSchlsk,i + #3DistPopk + $k,i,g (2)
Although the cross-sectional regressions are used to determine the initial 
relationship between measures of school funding and measures of student 
achievement and persistence, they will clearly produce biased regression 
coe&cients, i.e. despite the fact that controls for school district quality have 
been included, the true independent e#ect of total revenues per student on test 
scores will not have been captured. !e reason is that—among other problems 
of selection bias—parents will choose a location to live in based on their own 
socioeconomic status (SES) and desire for their children to do well in school. 
In order to alleviate this issue of selection bias, a di#erences structure is next 
employed to determine how changes in school funding are related to changes in 
student achievement. To explain the meaning of the di#erences regression in this 
context, it is useful to contrast the baseline OLS regression just employed to the 
di#erences OLS regression which is next employed. In the baseline regression, 
the le$-hand side variable are used as the level of student achievement in the 
district, and on the right-hand side are the levels of total revenues per student and 
school district characteristics. !e di#erence regression instead uses the change 
in student achievement between an initial and a "nal year—for persistence this 
is 1997–2006 changes and for test scores this is 2004–2006 changes—as the le$-
hand side variable and changes in total revenues per student, as well as changes 
in school district characteristics as the right-hand side variables. !e initial level 
of school district characteristics—1997 levels for persistence, and 2004 levels 
for test scores—are also included to allow for a nonlinear relationship between 
student achievement and school quality. !e described methodology is parallel 
in structure to that used in J. Deke (2003). !e reasoning for using this type of 
analysis is as follows: Major changes to school funding which occurred during 
this time period were due to amendments to the School District Finance and 
Quality Performance Act. !is act was redistributive in nature so an increase in 
school funding would have occurred for lower-performing schools. In this way, 
focusing on a “%ow” analysis will alleviate the issue of selection bias since parents 
will not be selecting school locations conditional on the same characteristics 
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which are causing schools to see increases in total revenues per student.23
!e full regression used to determine the e#ect of total revenues per student 
on persistence for school district k between years i and j is thus: 
'Persistencek = %0 + %1 'TRSk + %2&DistSchlsk + %3DistSchlsk,i + %4DistPopk + uk (3)
where
'TRSk = TRSk,j – TRSk,i
'Persistencek = Persistencek,j – Persistencek,i
&DistSchlsk = DistSchlsk,j – DistSchlsk,i
In the regressions, the initial level of DistSchls is used to allow for the possibility 
of a nonlinear relationship between DistSchls and Persistence, i.e. initial levels of 
school district characteristics are employed in the analysis. Only the level—and 
not the di#erenced amount—of DistPop is used because it comes from Census 
2000 data where only one year of data is available. 
Once again, test-score information follows the same relationship for the 
outcomes of reading and math pro"ciency. Speci"cally, for grade g in school 
district k between years i and j: 
'TestScoreg,k = %0 + %1'TRSk + %2&DistSchlsk + %3DistSchlsk,i + %4DistPopk + ug,k (4)
where
'TRSk = TRSk,j – TRSk,i
'TestScoreg,k = TestScoreg,k,j – TestScoreg,k,i
&DistSchlsk = DistSchlsk,j – DistSchlsk,i
A limitation of the analysis is the short timeframe for which the di#erencing 
analysis is available for test-score data. !e di#erencing regressions where test 
scores are an outcome, therefore, serve as an interesting additional result; however, 
the more consistent measures of student achievement in the di#erencing portion 
of the analysis are student persistence.24
Robustness Analysis
To allow for the possibility that results were a#ected by censoring of observations, 
all regressions were additionally run using a Tobit regression structure. !e initial 
assumptions regarding variables to be included in the analysis are all the same 
as in the previous sections; however, now the additional condition of censoring 
is allowed for in the analysis. Tobit regression is allowable in cross-sectional 
23. If anything, the e#ect of per pupil revenues on achievement will be underestimated since 
presumably higher achieving students are moving away from increasing school funding during this 
time period. !is will be true if the only changes in funding were due to the amendments. !is should 
be kept in mind when analyzing the "nal results of the analysis. 
24. It is also possible that the act will go into e#ect with a time lag and, for this reason, the e#ect of the 
last year or two of amendments may not fully show up if they require more than a year or two to fully 
take e#ect. !is is a possibility that should be noted in any estimation of results of an educational act 
and is again noted in the conclusion.
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regressions as well as in di#erence regressions in keeping with the structure in 
the earlier section. A Tobit analysis was especially relevant in the cases where top 
censoring might be suspected. Generally, the Tobit regression structure assumes 
there is a latent outcome variable y* such that the true regression should be: 
y* = #X + $,   $ | X ~ N(0, '2). In reality, only y is observed where y=max(0, y*) 
in bottom-censored regressions and alternatively y=min(1, y*) in top-censored 
regressions such as those in the present analysis.
r esults and findings
Summary Statistics
Table 1 displays trends over time in total revenues per student, student persistence, 
student test scores, and school district educational characteristics. Overall, 
Table 1 paints a picture of school districts increasing funding and resources for 
students and those experiencing higher rates of persistence and achievement on 
test scores. To conclude that these relationships were more than correlations, 
however, requires signi"cant analysis beyond these simple summary statistics. 
It is for this reason that a$er describing the summary statistics in Table 1 and 
Table 2 in more detail, results from the regression analysis allowing for a more 
in-depth analysis will be discussed. 
In Table 1, in%ation-adjusted total revenues per student increased over this 
time period from approximately $7,500 per student in 1997 to $9,400 per student 
in 2006. !e one clear exception to the upwards trend in per pupil revenues was 
a sharp decrease in the year 2004. 
Measures of persistence have also been exhibiting a generally consistent trend 
of students improving over time, with the fraction receiving diplomas and the 
graduation rate increasing and the dropout rate decreasing. For instance, the 
graduation rate went from 89.7% in 1997 to 91.3% in 2006. Similarly, the fraction 
receiving diplomas went from 94% in 1997 up to 97% in 2006. Dropout rates 
also display a generally downward trend from the period 1997–2004 going from 
1.7 dropouts per 100 students in the year 1997 to a low of 0.92 dropouts per 100 
students in 2004; however, they did display a sharp increase in the 2005–2006 
time period. In terms of test scores, the data for math and reading is somewhat 
more limited, containing information only for the 2004–2006 time period. For 
this three-year period of time, student test scores in both math and reading were 
generally increasing over time for all relevant grades. 
During the 1997–2006 time period, school districts experienced a movement 
towards higher enrollment levels, more full-time equivalent teachers, and a lower 
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pupil-teacher ratio. !e fraction on free lunch declined from the higher levels 
(33%) from the 1997–1998 period, but rose somewhat from the 1999–2001 lows 
(21–22%). !e number of full-time equivalent teachers went from a low of 103.3 
in 1997 to a high of 115.2 in 2006, while the average enrollment went from a low 
of 1,536 students in 1997 to a high of 1,599 students in 2009. 
!e remaining information on school districts, which was used in this analysis 
comes from Census 2000 data. Table 2 displays these characteristics of Kansas 
school districts. It is apparent that just over 10% of students in Kansas school 
districts were living below the poverty line with a low of approximately 0% and 
a high of almost 40% living in poverty. !e median income in the typical Kansas 
school districts stood at approximately $44,000 with some districts having a 
median income as high as $100,000, and others as low as $30,000. It is also true 
that approximately 80% of Kansans had at least a high school diploma and 72% 
of men were participating in the labor force—as were 58% of women. !ese 
local characteristics of school districts are used as control characteristics in the 
following regressions. 
Table 1. KS School District Characteristics 1997–2006
Panel A: School District 
Information 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Revenues Per Student 
(in thousands) 7.5 7.7 7.8 7.9 7.8 8.3 8.7 8.4 8.7 9.4
Pupil Teacher Ratio 13.5 13.3 13.1 12.9 13.0 13.2 13.1 13.0 12.8 12.3
Full Time Equivalent 
Teachers 103.3 104.8 108.0 107.3 108.4 107.4 107.8 109.3 111.9 115.2
Total Enrollment 1536 1539 1538 1536 1543 1548 1556 1562 1564 1599
Fraction Free Lunch 0.33 0.33 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.26
Panel B: Persistence 
Information 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Dropout Rate 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.0 0.9 0.9 1.5 1.6
Graduation Rate 89.7 89.8 89.9 90.6 91.1 89.2 90.0 91.7 91.1 91.3
Fraction Diplomas 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.97
Panel C: Pro"ciency Rates 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Grade 4 Math - - - - - - - 82.7 87.5 83.5
Grade 7 Math - - - - - - - 68.0 72.1 72.5
Grade 10 Math - - - - - - - 52.0 54.8 61.0
Grade 5 Reading - - - - - - - 71.7 78.1 79.8
Grade 8 Reading - - - - - - - 75.4 78.8 80.4
Grade 11 Reading - - - - - - - 63.0 65.8 79.1
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Regression Analysis
Table 3 displays cross-sectional regressions where each of the outcome variables 
chosen consists of various measures of persistence in panel A and various test 
scores by grade in panel B. !e panel A regressions are run for each of the years 
1997–2006 and the panel B regressions are run for selected years in the 2003–
2006 range with the years chosen depending on availability of a particular test 
in a given year. !e regressions progressively add in the DistPopul and DistEduc 
controls—labeled CENSUS INFO and SCHOOL INFO respectively. !is means 
that only the last column of each persistence regression for each year corresponds 
to equation (1), and only the last column of each test-score regression for each 
grade-year combination corresponds to equation (2). Due to this structure, 
Panel A contains the results from 90 separate regressions, while panel B contains 
the results of 82 separate regressions for a sum total of 172 separate regressions 
in Table 3. 
Panel A of Table 3 displays the e#ects of total revenues per student on the 
three measures of student persistence in the data—namely the fraction receiving 
diplomas, the dropout rate, and the graduation rate. !ese regressions show that 
an increase in total revenues per student serves to improve student persistence 
(i.e. lower dropouts and improved graduation rates and the fraction receiving 
diplomas) as evidenced by the generally positive coe&cients on total revenues 
per student in the regressions for the fraction receiving diplomas and graduation 
rates, and the negative coe&cients for the regression where dropout rate is the 
le$-hand side variable. !is provides some slight evidence for positive e#ects 
of revenues on persistence, but they do not appear to remain when including 
district controls. One anomaly is the negative and signi"cant relationship 
Table 2. Kansas School District Characteristics (Census 2000)
Mean S.D. Minimum Maximum
Fraction of Children in Poverty 0.11 0.06 0.00 0.40
Median Family Income 44005 8724 31100 102987
Fraction Males in Labor Force 0.72 0.06 0.37 0.92
Fraction Females in Labor Force 0.58 0.06 0.44 0.73
Fraction with College Degree 0.24 0.09 0.07 0.79
Fraction with Associates Degree 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.16
Fraction Who are HS Grads 0.47 0.08 0.12 0.67
Fraction 9-12 Years School 0.12 0.04 0.02 0.24
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between total revenues per student and the fraction receiving diplomas for the 
fully controlled regression in the year 1997. Since this pattern does not persist in 
the data and is not evident at all until including district controls, this particular 
anomaly does not appear to be a relevant concern.
Panel B of Table 3 shows that there was also little e#ect of total revenues 
per student on student test scores in any grade. Once again, only one of the 
regressions with both district controls exhibits a signi"cant coe&cient on total 
revenues per student. !is is the case for reading in grade 8 in 2004. In all other 
cases, any initial positive e#ects—present mostly in 2004 and to some extent 
in 2003—disappear when adding district controls to the regression. Overall, at 
the cross-sectional level there does not appear to be a signi"cant e#ect of total 
revenues per student on test scores or persistence a$er controlling for school 
district characteristics. It is also important to note that there is more evidence 
for the persistence than the test-scores regressions due to the longer timeframe 
for the persistence regressions.
Although the numerical coe&cients on the school district control variables 
used in the Tables are not displayed due to space constraints, it is interesting 
to note the presence or absence of signi"cant relationships between them and 
the outcome measures. In these cross-sectional regressions, pupil-teacher ratios, 
number of full-time equivalent teachers, enrollment, and fraction on free lunch 
all have signi"cant relationships with the dropout and graduation rate. Of these 
school district controls, only the pupil-teacher ratio is signi"cantly related to the 
fraction receiving diplomas in any instance. !ere are also some instances where 
there is a signi"cant relationship between both (a) average level of schooling in 
the district and (b) the number of "ve- to seventeen-year olds below the poverty 
line with measures of persistence. !e importance of these Census measures 
of district characteristics on persistence should not be exaggerated since they 
disappear when also controlling for the pupil-teacher ratio, full-time equivalent 
teachers, enrollment, and fraction on free lunch. 
In terms of the cross-sectional test-score regressions, in almost no instances 
are any of the pupil-teacher ratio, full-time equivalent teachers, or enrollment 
signi"cantly related to student test scores. !e only variable that is signi"cantly 
related to test scores in multiple regressions is the fraction on free lunch. In 
a similar vein, there is sometimes an e#ect of median family income and the 
number of "ve- to seventeen-year olds below the poverty line on test scores. 
!ese e#ects appear more prevalent for measures of science test scores than any 
of math, reading, or social science. 
Taken together, there is some evidence of a relationship between the district 
controls and persistence in the cross section, particularly for district measures 
related to the schools themselves, that is, pupil-teacher ratio, enrollment, fraction 
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on free lunch, and number of full-time equivalent teachers. !ese relationships 
are weaker when examining the relationship on test scores and tend to focus 
slightly more on the income variables—median family income, fraction on free 
lunch, and number in poverty. 
Table 4 displays results from the Tobit regression where the structure is exactly 
the same as in Table 3. As Panels A and B of Table 4 demonstrate, there is no 
substantive change in the patterns we see in Table 4 a$er using this robustness 
analysis. !e one notable departure in Table 4 is the higher levels of signi"cance 
for the Tobit cross-sectional persistence regressions including district level 
controls. !is is particularly true for the fraction receiving diplomas and for 
the dropout rate in the last several years of the data. One anomaly of note is 
the positive e#ect of revenues on dropouts—the opposite direction expected—
in 2005. !e reasoning for this anomaly could be as follows: !e majority of 
amendment changes went into e#ect during the 2005 school year, and there was 
a signi"cant change in the amount of funding which was targeted towards at-
risk students during the 2005 school year, so it is natural to observe that total 
revenues per student have a negative e#ect on dropout rate since funding was 
directed towards schools that were doing poorly at this point in time. It is also 
possible, as evidence from Table 4, that this increase in funding would not a#ect 
graduation rates or the fraction receiving diplomas in an adverse fashion during 
that year. !e longitudinal regressions which follow, however, do help to explain 
in more detail how funding changes a#ected schools over the entire time period. 
!e other piece of information gleaned from these regressions is the decrease 
in the signi"cance of the e#ect of total revenues per student on the test-score 
regressions. !is provides even more evidence that revenues were not helping to 
improve test scores. 
It would be unwise to "nish the analysis at this point, for the reason mentioned 
earlier regarding possible selection bias and it is, therefore, necessary to obtain 
results from the di#erenced regression in Table 5, as well as the Tobit analysis 
di#erence regression in Table 6. 
Table 5 displays results of the di#erence regressions and shows how changes 
in revenues per student a#ected changes in persistence (in panel A) and 
changes in math and reading scores (in panel B). Panel A displays results from 
all three types of persistence of interest, while Panel B results are broken out 
by grade of analysis. Once again, controls are added in progressively as well as 
including initial levels of the school district characteristics so that for panel A, 
only the fourth column of each set of persistence regressions corresponds to the 
regression speci"ed in equation (3), and in panel B the fourth column of each 
grade-subject combination corresponds to the regression speci"ed in equation 
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contained in panel A, and 24 separate regressions contained in panel B for a 
total of 36 separate regressions in Table 5. 
Panel A of Table 5 shows no regressions where the e#ect of changes in total 
revenues per student on changes in persistence reaches conventional levels of 
statistical signi"cance. Similarly, panel B of Table 5 shows no regressions where 
the e#ect of changes in total revenues per student on changes in test scores 
reaches conventional levels of statistical signi"cance—either positive or negative. 
Both panels of Table 5 support the idea that there is little or no e#ect of total 
revenues per student over this time period on persistence or test scores. Once 
again, the results for test scores are measured over a three-year time period while 
persistence is measured over a 10-year time period and so are more trustworthy 
in nature. 
Table 5. E#ect of Changes in Revenue per Student on Student Outcomes
Panel A: E#ect on Persistence (2006–1997)
CENSUS INFO NO YES YES YES NO YES YES YES NO YES YES YES
SCHOOL INFO NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES
INITIAL LEVELS NO NO NO YES NO NO NO YES NO NO NO YES
Change in Dropout Rate Change in Grad Rate Change in Frac Diplomas
Change Rev. per Stu. -0.09 -0.106 0.12 0.196 -0.18 -0.222 0.084 -0.005 0.014 0.014 0.011 0.023
[0.64] [0.68] [1.21] [1.32] [0.44] [0.53] [0.19] [0.01] [0.84][0.92][0.75][1.28]
Observations 281 281 281 281 280 280 280 280 292 292 292 292
Panel B: E#ect on Test Scores (2006–2004)
CENSUS INFO NO YES YES YES NO YES YES YES NO YES YES YES
SCHOOL INFO NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES
INITIAL LEVELS NO NO NO YES NO NO NO YES NO NO NO YES
Change in Math Scores
4th Grade 7th Grade 10th Grade
Change Rev. Per Stu. -1.05 -0.848 -0.514 -1 1.06 1.335 0.626 1.834 1.888 2.532 1.241 1.769
(2006–2004) [0.77] [0.62] [0.37] [0.78] [0.86] [0.94] [0.42] [1.21] [1.35][1.71][0.74][0.96]
Observations 264 264 264 264 265 265 265 265 271 271 271 271
Change in Reading Scores
5th Grade 8th Grade 11th Grade
Change Rev. Per Stu. -1.049 -1.285 -1.045 -0.64 -0.97 -1.391 -2.087 -1.812 0.372 0.329 -0.73 -1.12
(2006–2004) [1.06] [1.18] [0.89] [0.56] [0.73] [1.01] [1.48] [1.06] [0.38][0.32][0.65][1.01]
Observations 265 265 265 265 270 270 270 270 267 267 267 267
NOTE: Test score regressions are run at the grade level for each school district while Persistence regressions are run at the 
school district level. Robust standard errors are employed in all regressions. CENSUS INFO includes district level averages for 
the fraction of women and men in the labor force, Median family income, the fraction of children living in poverty and the 
fraction of individuals in each of "ve educational groups (1–8, 9–12, High School Degree, Associate Degree, College or more). 
SCHOOL INFO includes changes between 1997 or 2004 (for persistence or test scores respectively) and 2006 which occurred 
in the following variables: the pupil teacher ratio, the school enrollment, the number of full time equivalent teachers, and the 
fraction of students on free lunch. For the test score regressions, INITIAL LEVELS includes information on the 2004 values of 
the pupil teacher ratio, the school enrollment, the number of full time equivalent teachers, and the fraction of students on free 
lunch while the persistence regressions INITIAL LEVELS includes the 1997 values for these same variables. Absolute values 
of t-statistics in brackets. *Signi"cant at 5% level. **Signi"cant at 1% level.
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Once again, it is useful to note which of the control variables were signi"-
cantly related to measures of change in persistence and test scores. In panel A, 
there were almost no regressions where there was a signi"cant relationship be-
tween the control variables and changes in persistence. !e only variables which 
displayed at times signi"cant coe&cients were the initial level of full-time equiv-
alent teachers or the average level of schooling attained in the school district in 
Census 2000 data. In panel B, only changes in the pupil-teacher ratio showed up 
as signi"cantly related to changes in test scores. In a few cases, there was a sig-
ni"cant relationship between the Census 2000 characteristics of average school-
ing and median family income in the district; however, these were more rare.
Table 6 replicates the exact same structure as Table 5 as well as displaying the 
same general pattern of results. !e only di#erence is that Table 6 employs a Tobit 
regression for this robustness portion of the analysis. In all but one scenario, 
there is no statistically signi"cant e#ect of changes in revenues on changes in 
either persistence or test scores. !e one exception where the t-statistic on the 
coe&cient of “Changes in Revenues per Student” is above the 5% statistical 
signi"cance threshold conventionally employed is for the case where full 
controls are employed in the regression—speci"cally, census information, school 
information, and initial levels are included—and the outcome measure is changes 
in dropout rates between 1997 and 2006. In this particular case, the coe&cient 
on changes in revenues is 0.195 with a t-statistic of 2.15, above the threshold to 
be statistically signi"cantly di#erent from zero at the 5% level. !e reason that 
this coe&cient may be positive could be due to the anomalous nature of what 
occurred in 2005 in particular—as seen in the regressions at the cross-sectional 
level in Table 4—which will also be evidenced in the di#erenced regressions. 
It is thus possible that there is some selection of funding a#ecting dropouts by 
targeting the at-risk population of students. It should be noted, however, that 
in no other instance is there a statistically signi"cant e#ect at the 5% level of 
changes in revenues on either persistence or test-score changes. T-statistics on 
changes in revenue per student in all cases but the one mentioned range from 
a low close to 0 to a high—approaching, but not gaining conventional levels of 
signi"cance—above 1.9 in absolute value. In the majority of cases, the t-statistics 
are below one in absolute value, similar to the results in Table 5, implying very 
little reason to trust that the associated coe&cients are di#erent from zero. In 
the subset of cases where the t-statistics are approaching statistical signi"cance, 
the e#ects show an increase in revenues associated with an increase in student 
outcomes. Because these results are not statistically signi"cant at conventional 
levels of signi"cance, however, no clear statements should be made from that set 
of results. 
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conclusions
Changes in the School District Finance and Quality Performance Act over 1997–
2006 had little e#ect on student persistence or test scores. It should be kept in 
mind, however, that the current results may be an underestimate of the e#ect of 
school funding on student achievement due to persistent problems of selection 
into schooling, which were not possible to correct in the current analysis. It is 
also possible that some of the amendment e#ects show up with a lag and are thus 
not being picked up by the analysis that only covers the years through 2006. 
Table 6. Tobit Regressions E#ect of Changes in Revenue per Student on Student 
Outcomes
Panel A: E#ect on Persistence (2006–1997)
CENSUS INFO NO YES YES YES ( NO YES YES YES ( NO YES YES YES
SCHOOL INFO NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES
INITIAL LEVELS NO NO NO YES ( NO NO NO YES ( NO NO NO YES
Change in Dropout Rate ( Change in Grad Rate ( Change in Frac Diplomas
Change Rev.
per Student
-0.091 -0.107 0.12 0.195 -0.176 -0.215 0.085 -0.001 0.014 0.014 0.011 0.024
[1.04] [1.22] [1.33] [2.15]* [0.34] [0.42] [0.15] [0.00] [1.56] [1.58] [1.11] [1.95]
Observations 281 281 281 281 274 274 274 274 276 276 276 276
Panel B: E#ect on Test Scores (2006–2004)
CENSUS INFO NO YES YES YES ( NO YES YES YES ( NO YES YES YES
SCHOOL INFO NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES
INITIAL LEVELS NO NO NO YES ( NO NO NO YES ( NO NO NO YES
Change in Math Scores
4th Grade ( 7th Grade ( 10th Grade
Change Rev. Per Stu. -1.074 -0.889 -0.544 -1.03 1.088 1.392 0.69 1.902 1.922 2.576 1.282 1.834
(2006–2004) [0.90] [0.72] [0.41] [0.73] [0.75] [0.93] [0.43] [1.13] [1.48] [1.93] [0.93] [1.26]
Observations 264 264 264 264 265 265 265 265 271 271 271 271
Change in Reading Scores
5th Grade 8th Grade ( 11th Grade
Change Rev. Per Stu. -1.061 -1.309 -1.062 -0.65 -0.932 -1.344 -2.06 -1.774 0.371 0.332 -0.725 -1.107
(2006–2004) [0.94] [1.13] [0.86] [0.49] [0.88] [1.26] [1.80] [1.45] [0.32] [0.28] [0.59] [0.81]
Observations 265 265 265 265 270 270 270 270 267 267 267 267
NOTE: Test score regressions are run at the grade level for each school district while Persistence regressions are run at the 
school district level. Robust standard errors are employed in all regressions. CENSUS INFO includes district level averages for 
the fraction of women and men in the labor force, Median family income, the fraction of children living in poverty and the 
fraction of individuals in each of "ve educational groups (1–0, 9–12, High School Degree, Associate Degree, College or more). 
SCHOOL INFO includes changes between 2004 and 2006 which occurred in the following variables: the pupil teacher ratio, 
the school enrollment, the number of full time equivalent teachers, and the fraction of students on free lunch. For the test score 
regressions, INITIAL LEVELS includes information on the 2004 values of the pupil teacher ratio, the school enrollment, the 
number of full time equivalent teachers, and the fraction of students on free lunch while the persistence regressions INITIAL 
LEVELS includes the 1997 values for these same variables. Absolute values of t-statistics in brackets. *Signi"cant at 5% level. 
**Signi"cant at 1% level.
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It is also important to note that the availability and allocation of resources 
is not equivalent to the ability and means to use these resources e#ectively to 
help students. Teacher and administrator ability/training/salary, administrative 
structure, and parental involvement all play a role in how e#ectively resources 
are employed in helping students to succeed.25 Besides these factors, at issue is 
whether schools that actually need and know how to use funds are the ones that 
receive them. It is alternatively possible that funds are allocated in a way so as to 
satisfy political exigencies rather than school district’s direct concerns.
!e diversity of student populations and the demographic makeup is also 
important for schools to consider in making their choices in how to create the 
best environment for students to succeed. In the cross-sectional regressions, 
there was some slight evidence that characteristics of school districts other than 
funding were in some instances signi"cantly related to student outcomes.26 !e 
pupil-teacher ratio, fraction on free lunch, enrollment levels, and number of 
full-time equivalent teachers were, at times, signi"cant predictors of persistence 
in the cross section if not in the di#erence analysis. Some of these, such as the 
pupil-teacher ratio and the number of full-time equivalent teachers are partially 
able to be manipulated by school districts. !ere was also some slight evidence 
that income and poverty levels of students and their school district areas were 
related to persistence and test-score achievement. !is should be noted since it 
implies that administrators need to account for the underlying populations and 
neighborhoods and learn to use the correct strategies for areas with higher rates 
of poverty and lower-median family income levels.27 
All of these various issues are key factors to consider in moving forward to 
decide on the best school policies related to levels of school funding, as well 
as the distribution and uses of those funds so as best to meet student need and 
foster student achievement.
25. !e literature on parental involvement consistently shows a positive e#ect of parental involvement 
on student achievement, particularly for minority and low-income students. A.J. Houtenville and K. 
Smith Conway, 2008. Parental E#ort, School Resources, and Student Achievement. Journal of Human 
Resources. 43(2). 437-453. Evidence that allocating funding to raising teacher salaries—either to attract 
better teachers or to encourage current teachers to work harder—serves to increase test scores. L. 
Chaudhary, 2009. Education Inputs, Student Performance and School Finance Reform in Michigan. 
Economics of Education Review. 28(1): 90-98. It is possible to assess how teachers and administrators 
understood how to use an in%ux of funds and, therefore, whether such an in%ux of funds improves 
achievement. L.Goe, 2006. Evaluating a State-Sponsored School Improvement Program through an 
Improved School Finance Lens. Journal of Education Finance. 31(4): 395-419.
26. G. Galster et al 2003. !e In%uence of Neighborhood Poverty during Childhood on Fertility, 
Education, and Earnings Outcomes. Housing Studies. 22(5): 723-751.
27. R.C. Pianta and R.J.Walsh. 1996. High Risk Children in Schools: Constructing Sustaining 
Relationships. New York, NY: Routledge Publishers. 
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